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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a number of recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has 
characterized statutory claims of employment discrimination as tort claims.1 
This is not the first time that the Court has characterized statutory civil rights 
claims as “sound[ing] basically in tort,”2 but these cases are unusual in using 
that characterization to import substantive rules of tort law into the 
                                                                                                                     
 * Carter C. Kissell Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law at the Ohio 
State University; B.A., 1979, Kansas State University; J.D., 1982, University of Kansas 
School of Law. This Article arose out of research that I conducted while supported by a 
grant from the Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies at the Michael E. Moritz 
College of Law at The Ohio State University, with the assistance of Isabelle Daugareilh 
and Loïc Lerouge of COMPTRASEC, the Centre de Droit Comparé du Travail et de la 
Sécurité Sociale (Centre for Comparative Labour and Social Security Law) at the 
Université Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV, France. I would like to thank the participants in the 
Ohio State Law Journal Symposium on Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and 
Conflict for their presentations and comments that helped me shape the ideas presented in 
this Article. I also appreciate the comments of participants in the faculty colloquium at the 
Kansas State University Department of Philosophy, who invited me to return home to 
present this Article. 
 1 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013) 
(including federal statutory claims of workplace discrimination as within the scope of “any 
tort claim”); Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (characterizing the 
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) as a “federal 
tort” and an “intentional tort”). 
 2 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (In finding a right to jury trial for a 
damage claim under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 for racial discrimination in 
housing, the Court noted that the claim “sounds basically in tort,” in that the statute 
“merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for 
the injury caused by the defendant’s wrongful breach.”). 
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interpretation to be given to statutory terms.3 While it may be too soon to 
predict with any certainty the eventual effect of this importation of tort 
concepts into federal statutory anti-discrimination law, it seems likely that the 
application of tort concepts to claims of employment discrimination will have 
the effect of narrowing, rather than expanding, the effect and reach of the anti-
discrimination laws.4 
Even before this recent focus on tort law as the foundation for 
discrimination claims, some scholars have seemed to view sexual harassment 
claims as a species of tort, resisting the characterization of such claims as a 
form of employment discrimination.5 And courts facing claims of sexual 
harassment under Title VII in early cases expressed particular resistance to the 
notion that harassment constituted discrimination by the employer or was 
directed at employees “because of sex,” instead viewing the conduct to be 
motivated by “personal proclivity, peculiarity[,] or mannerism” and to be 
preventable by the employer only by employing “asexual” persons.6 
Curiously, while early courts viewed sexual harassment not to be 
                                                                                                                     
 3 See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 
1431, 1432–33 & n.1 (2012) (noting that while prior characterization of statutory 
employment discrimination claims as torts was “mostly metaphorical,” the Court in Staub 
v. Proctor Hospital used the characterization in order to import the tort concept of 
proximate cause into the context of employment discrimination claims). 
 4 Id. at 1457 (noting that incorporation of the notion of proximate cause into 
employment discrimination law is likely to make it harder for plaintiffs to prevail on claims 
of employment discrimination, even when they can show “cause-in-fact”). 
 5 See Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile 
Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 434 (1998). Professor 
Hager argues that viewing sexual harassment as discrimination under Title VII, particularly 
harassment consisting of sexual overtures, is anomalous, because such harassment is not 
based on contempt against women. Id. at 379. He also argues that prohibiting harassment 
under Title VII is wrong as a policy matter because employer liability for harasser conduct 
causes employers to over-enforce prohibitions against harassment, resulting in harm to the 
workplace environment, because employers are unfairly held liable for conduct that they do 
not bear responsibility for and because expecting employers to control harassment in the 
workplace “encourages a dependent, authoritarian, and passive form of feminism” and 
therefore “undermines the very dignity and autonomy insulted by harassment.” Id. at 417, 
424. Professor Hager concedes the difficulties of pursuing harassment under the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and suggests the adoption of a new tort of 
harassment or “tortious infliction of malicious dignitary assault.” Id. at 434; see also Ellen 
Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 333, 345–63 (1990). Professor Paul argues that sexual harassment should 
not be considered sex discrimination because that would be inconsistent with legislative 
intent, because she contends that sexual harassment is based on sexual desire rather than 
animus, because liability is imposed on the employer, who she views as one of the 
“victims” of harassment, rather than the harasser, see id. at 336, 346, and because she 
believes that it is difficult to distinguish harassment from “intimate private relations.” Id. at 
357‒58. She argues for the adoption of a new tort of sexual harassment modeled on the tort 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 361. 
 6 Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163–64 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
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discrimination because it was thought to be motivated by sexual desire, the 
courts seem to have come around to the belief that harassment motivated by 
sexual desire is classic discrimination “because of sex.” This is reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.7—a 
case addressing principally same-sex harassment—in which the Court seemed 
to suggest that most sexual harassment is motivated by sexual desire, which 
the Court concluded is “because of sex.”8 
As should be clear from my prior articles,9 I do not believe that most 
sexual harassment is motivated by sexual desire. Nor do I harbor any doubt 
that sexual harassment occurring in the context of the workplace is a form of 
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, directed against women and 
men in the workplace because of their sex and gender, including as a way to 
express gender hostility and to punish non-conformance with society’s gender 
norms. Neither do I take issue with holding employers liable for sexual 
harassment occurring in the workplace under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.10 
The Supreme Court’s recent commingling of tort and discrimination 
concepts and its insistence that statutory discrimination claims are torts, 
however, raise the issue of what might happen if the lower courts take 
seriously the Court’s assertion that discrimination claims are torts. If acts of 
discrimination, including harassment, are tortious, then perhaps those acts 
should regularly result in tort liability, not only the liability imposed by statute. 
This issue has particular importance in the area of harassment, in which the 
courts have taken a number of steps to limit employer liability for 
harassment,11 thereby often depriving employees of any remedy for even 
                                                                                                                     
 7 Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 8 Id. at 80–81 (“Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to 
draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct 
typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to 
assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex. The same 
chain of inference would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there 
were credible evidence that the harasser was homosexual. But harassing conduct need not 
be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of 
sex.”). 
 9 See generally L. Camille Hébert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 565 (1995); L. Camille Hébert, Sexual Harassment as Discrimination 
“Because of . . . Sex”: Have We Come Full Circle?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 439 (2001). 
 10 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
 11 Although the Supreme Court’s decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), 
recognizing vicarious liability on the part of employers for harassment engaged in by 
supervisors might have been seen as expanding employer liability, the Court has acted 
since that time to limit the application of those decisions by adopting a quite narrow 
definition of who constitutes a “supervisor.” See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 
2434, 2439 (2013). In addition, the lower courts have applied the standard set forth in 
Ellerth and Faragher in such a way as to limit, rather than expand, employer liability. See 
L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual 
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actionable sexual harassment because the courts have declined to extend 
liability under Title VII to individual harassers.12 If sexual harassment is a tort, 
then it would seem appropriate to impose tort liability on the harasser and 
perhaps the employer as well. 
This Article, therefore, addresses the issue of whether sexual harassment 
in the workplace might be conceptualized as a dignitary tort and what the 
implications would be of such a conceptualization of a claim of sexual 
harassment. In fact, my interest in this issue was motivated in large part by my 
frustration about the way in which courts had been applying the “because of 
sex” requirement, concluding that explicitly sexual and explicitly sexually 
denigrating conduct did not constitute “discrimination because of sex.” If 
courts and judges have a hard time believing that sexually explicit and 
denigrating harassment is discrimination because of sex, while they insist that 
they view that behavior as unacceptable and intolerable in the modern 
workplace,13 might they be convinced to impose liability on the perpetrators of 
such harassment on the ground that the behavior is a tortious violation of the 
dignitary rights of the women and men on whom that behavior is imposed? 
This Article will address the issues involved in conceptualizing sexual 
harassment as a dignitary tort, first by briefly discussing the approaches taken 
by certain other legal systems, which characterize sexual harassment not only 
as a form of sex discrimination but also as a violation of dignity rights of 
employees, or as only a violation of dignity interests. Next, the Article will 
explore what type of tort sexual harassment most resembles and explore the 
potential for relying on that tort claim in order to obtain redress for sexual 
harassment in the workplace. Finally, the Article will address the possible 
advantages and disadvantages, both practical and theoretical, of casting sexual 
harassment claims within the framework of tort. The Article will conclude 
with a proposal for conceptualizing sexual harassment as a dignitary tort, 
without losing some of the benefits gained by recognition of the ways in which 
sexual harassment implicates interests in gender equality in the workplace. 
                                                                                                                     
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 713–29 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Ellerth and Faragher and the way in which the standards from those decisions have 
been interpreted by the lower courts). 
 12 See Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that “relief under 
Title VII is available against only the employer and not against individual employees 
whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act” and noting that this was the rule 
followed by “the majority of our sister circuits”). 
 13 See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764–65 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“While the harassment alleged by Vickers reflects conduct that is socially unacceptable 
and repugnant to workplace standards of proper treatment and civility, Vickers[’] claim 
does not fit within the prohibitions of the law.”); Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 766, at *2, *28 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) (calling the sexual harassing conduct 
of the plaintiff’s co-workers “outrageous” and expressing sympathy “with his plight,” but 
concluding that the conduct was not prohibited under Title VII). 
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II. EXISTING PROHIBITIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT BASED ON 
DIGNITARY HARM 
One does not have to look far to find a model for the conceptualization of 
sexual harassment as a type of dignitary tort. The Directives of the European 
Union define sexual harassment as “where any form of unwanted verbal, non-
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature occurs, with the purpose or effect 
of violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.”14 
Although this prohibition of sexual harassment still views harassment as a 
form of discrimination,15 there is no express requirement that the harassing 
conduct be shown to be motivated by sex or gender; the sexual nature of the 
conduct appears sufficient to satisfy any such tie to sex discrimination.16 
The EU Directive’s focus on dignity suggests a focus on the individualized 
effects of harassment and the way in which sexual harassment causes 
embarrassment, shame, and humiliation on the part of the men and women 
subjected to that harassment, in part because of the way that harassment 
intrudes into their physical, psychological, and emotional space.17 This notion 
of violation of dignity is a much more “tort-like” concept than we generally 
find in United States employment discrimination law, under which actionable 
                                                                                                                     
 14 Directive 2006/54/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 
2006 on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment 
of Men and Women in Matters of Employment and Occupation (Recast), 2006 O.J. (L. 
204) 23, 27 [hereinafter Equal Opportunities Directive].  
 15 That Directive provides that “[h]arassment and sexual harassment are contrary to 
the principle of equal treatment between men and women and constitute discrimination on 
grounds of sex for the purposes of this Directive.” Id. at 23. Earlier actions of entities of the 
European Union that ultimately culminated in the Directive suggest that harassment should 
be prohibited both because of its effect on dignity of workers and because of its 
discriminatory nature and effects. In the Resolution of May 29, 1990 by the Council of the 
European Communities, the Council indicated that “unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, 
or other conduct based on sex affecting the dignity of women and men at work, including 
the conduct of superiors and colleagues, is unacceptable and may, in certain circumstances, 
be contrary to the principle of equal treatment.” Council Resolution (EC) No. 90/C 157/02 
of 29 May 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 157) 1, 3.  
 16 The apparent link between the sexual nature of the conduct and the notion of 
discrimination seems to be confirmed by the Directive’s definition of “harassment,” 
defined as existing “where unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person occurs with the 
purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, and of creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.” Equal Opportunities Directive, 
supra note 14, at 26. While sexual conduct need not be shown to be related to the sex of a 
person, non-sexual conduct is required to meet this requirement to be within the scope of 
the Directive. See id. 
 17 See Kathrin Zippel, The European Union 2002 Directive on Sexual Harassment: A 
Feminist Success?, 7 COMP. EUR. POL. 139, 147 (2009) (suggesting that a focus on dignity 
rather than discrimination “individualize[s] the experience of women”). 
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sexual harassment must be shown to be discrimination because of sex in order 
to be within the reach of Title VII’s prohibition.18 
The legal definition of sexual harassment by other legal systems has taken 
a step even further away from discrimination and toward the conceptualization 
of sexual harassment as a violation of interests in dignity. In 2012, new 
prohibitions against sexual harassment were enacted into France’s labor and 
penal codes, after a prior prohibition of sexual harassment in the penal code 
had been invalidated by the French Constitutional Council.19 The Labor 
Code’s new prohibition of sexual harassment contains a two-part definition of 
sexual harassment, the first of which provides that “[n]o employee shall be 
required to submit to facts . . . of sexual harassment, consisting of repeated 
words or behavior with a sexual connotation, which undermine his or her 
dignity by reason of their degrading or humiliating nature or create against his 
or her an intimidating, hostile, or offensive situation.”20 Not only does this 
prohibition of sexual harassment not require any express showing that the 
harassment was motivated by sex discrimination, but the French legislature, as 
well as the French courts and many of its legal scholars, insists that sexual 
harassment is not a form of discrimination, making it extremely unlikely that 
any notion of discrimination is implied into the prohibition.21  
Other legal systems also treat sexual harassment in a manner similar to a 
dignitary tort, even when they retain the notion of sexual harassment as a form 
of discrimination. The Labour Code of Canada, applicable to federal 
employees, defines sexual harassment as “any conduct, comment, gesture or 
contact of a sexual nature . . . that is likely to cause offence or humiliation to 
                                                                                                                     
 18 The United States Supreme Court made clear in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998), that in all sexual harassment cases, the plaintiff “must always 
prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, 
but actually constituted ‘discrimination . . . because of . . . sex.’” Id. at 81 (emphasis in 
original). 
 19 See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2012-240 
QPC, May, 4, 2012, J.O. 8015 (Fr.). 
 20 CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.], art. L 1153-1 (Fr.) (translation provided by author). 
In the original French, the provision states: « Aucun salarié ne doit subir des faits . . . [s]oit 
de harcèlement sexuel, constitué par des propos ou comportements à connotation sexuelle 
répétés qui soit portent atteinte à sa dignité en raison de leur caractère dégradant ou 
humiliant, soit créent à son encontre une situation intimidante, hostile ou offesante ». The 
second part of the Labor Code’s prohibition of sexual harassment prohibits the use of 
serious pressure to obtain acts of a sexual nature. 
 21 For a detailed analysis of the French sexual harassment provisions, as well as the 
French legal system’s separation of the concepts of harassment from discrimination, see L. 
Camille Hébert, Divorcing Sexual Harassment from Sex: Lessons from the French, 21 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 11–23 (2013). The legislative history of the new 
prohibitions on sexual harassment in the French labor code and penal code indicates that, 
while sexual harassment is not generally viewed in France as a form of discrimination, a 
number of participants in the enactment of that legislation expressed the view that the 
existence of sexual harassment in the workplace “does implicate issues of equality between 
men and women.” Id. at 18–19. 
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any employee” or “that might, on reasonable grounds, be perceived by that 
employee as placing a condition of a sexual nature on employment or any 
opportunity for training or promotion.”22 Accordingly, sexual harassment can 
violate Canadian law without an express finding of discriminatory motivation, 
even though elsewhere Canadian law declares that sexual harassment is a form 
of prohibited discrimination.23 And the Canadian Supreme Court, interpreting 
a provincial prohibition of sexual harassment, made clear that sexual 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination, as limiting the employment 
opportunities of women.24 In the same decision, however, the court also 
emphasized the ways in which sexual harassment harms the dignitary interests 
of those subjected to harassment: 
Sexual harassment is a demeaning practice, one that constitutes a profound 
affront to the dignity of the employees forced to endure it. By requiring an 
employee to contend with unwelcome sexual actions or explicit sexual 
demands, sexual harassment in the workplace attacks the dignity and self-
respect of the victim both as an employee and as a human being.25 
Accordingly, while Canadian law clearly views sexual harassment as a 
form of discrimination on the basis of sex, it also recognizes the way in which 
sexual harassment constitutes a harm to dignity and appears to prohibit 
harassment at least in part because of that dignitary harm. 
As explained above, some legal systems have made the choice to make 
sexual harassment unlawful not because, or not only because, it results in 
unequal treatment of men and women in the workplace, but because the 
existence of sexually harassing behavior creates an environment injurious to 
the dignity of workers. This indicates that at least some legal systems 
conceptualize sexual harassment as a dignitary wrong, apart from its possible 
status as a wrong of inequality. This raises the question of whether sexual 
harassment might also be conceptualized as a dignitary wrong within our legal 
system, that is, whether sexual harassment might be conceptualized as a 
dignitary tort, rather than, or rather than just, a form of discrimination. 
                                                                                                                     
 22 Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, § 247.1. 
 23 Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, § 14(2) (providing that sexual 
harassment shall “be deemed to be harassment on a prohibited ground of discrimination”). 
 24 Janzen v. Platy Enters., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252, 1290–91 (Can.) (concluding that 
“sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination because it denies women equality of 
opportunity in employment because of their sex”). The Canadian Supreme Court noted that 
this had been the conclusion of almost all of the courts and human rights commissions to 
consider the issue under a wide variety of statutory prohibitions against sexual harassment, 
including the Canadian Labour Code and federal and provincial human rights statutes. See 
id. at 1276–79. 
 25 Id. at 1284. 
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III. IF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS A DIGNITARY TORT, WHAT TORT IS IT? 
To the extent that claims of sexual harassment might be conceptualized as 
a type of tort, the question then arises as to what type of existing tort claim a 
claim of sexual harassment most resembles. In a decision by the Supreme 
Court relatively early in its dealing with discrimination claims, the Court 
suggested not only that a discrimination claim—there, racial discrimination in 
housing—“sounds basically in tort,”26 but also suggested that discrimination 
claims might “be likened to” an action for intentional infliction of mental 
distress.27 And some courts have allowed employees bringing claims of 
harassment in the context of employment to state claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. For example, the Superior Court of 
Connecticut in the case of Leone v. New England Communications28 refused to 
dismiss an employee’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
based on his allegations that he had been subject to ethnic slurs, as well as 
comments on his penis, sexually offensive pictures on his computer, and 
comments about his sexuality. The court held that the conduct alleged by the 
plaintiff was sufficiently extreme and outrageous as required by the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress; the court emphasized the strong 
public policy expressed by prohibitions against discrimination and noted that 
this caused the conduct to be “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”29 
A claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as set forth in § 46 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, provides that “[a]n actor who by extreme 
and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
harm to another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the 
emotional harm causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm.”30 “Emotional 
harm” is defined to mean “impairment or injury to a person’s emotional 
tranquility,”31 although the comment to that definitional section indicates that 
the term includes “a variety of mental states, including fright, fear, sadness, 
sorrow, despondency, anxiety, humiliation, depression (and other mental 
illnesses) and a host of other detrimental—from mildly unpleasant to 
                                                                                                                     
 26 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974). 
 27 Id. at 195 n.10. The Court suggested that a claim of racial discrimination might also 
be likened to a claim of defamation. Id. 
 28 Leone v. New Eng. Commc’ns, No. CV010509525, 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 
1361 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002). 
 29 Id. at *8–9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the court quoted the entire 
definition of extreme and outrageous conduct—“so outrageous in character, and so extreme 
in degree as to go beyond all bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and 
‘utterly intolerable in a civilized community’”—the court emphasized the final clause of 
that definition. Id. at *9 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  
 30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 
(2012).  
 31 Id. § 45. 
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disabling—mental conditions.”32 A number of states have adopted either this 
or an earlier version of the Restatement’s definition of the tort.33 
The Restatement itself recognizes the potential overlap that exists between 
claims of employment discrimination and tort claims for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, but also notes the differences between the claims, 
including the persons or entities that may be liable under the different claims. 
The Restatement indicates that it is not intended to restrict plaintiffs from 
asserting occupational claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.34 
It seems clear that the documented harm caused by sexual harassment of 
women and men in the workplace, in addition to harm of an economic and 
sometimes of a physical nature, would meet the requirements of “emotional 
harm” for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The targets of 
sexual harassment often report feeling humiliation, anxiety, and fear as a result 
of the harassing conduct to which they have been subjected.35 These emotions, 
particularly humiliation, appear to be quite consistent with the experience of 
violation of or harm to one’s dignity. Interestingly, even workers who are not 
themselves the direct target of sexually harassing behavior, but who instead 
are subject to ambient sexual harassment or who experience sexual harassment 
indirectly, also report negative psychological outcomes.36 And while not every 
target or affected observer of harassment may be able to meet the requirement 
that the emotional harm be “severe,” many will undoubtedly be able to do 
so.37 
                                                                                                                     
 32 Id. § 45 cmt. a. 
 33 Id. § 46 cmt. a (noting that forty-nine jurisdictions expressly follow this section of 
the Restatement and that two other jurisdictions follow a modified version of the rule set 
forth in the section). 
 34 Id. § 46 cmt. n. 
 35 See Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed 
Organizations: Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL 
BEHAV. 28, 32–35 (1993) (reporting the results of studies indicating the psychological 
effects of sexual harassment, including emotional reactions such as anger, fear, depression, 
anxiety, irritability, loss of self-esteem, feelings of humiliation and alienation, and a sense 
of helplessness and vulnerability, and noting the similarity between the symptoms reported 
in the aftermath of sexual harassment and the symptoms characteristic of post-traumatic 
stress disorder); see also Kimberly T. Schneider et al., Job-Related and Psychological 
Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two 
Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401, 406–07, 412–13 (1997) (reporting results of a 
study in which women subjected to sexually harassing behaviors reported negative job-
related and psychological results, including stress, depression, and symptoms of post-
traumatic stress). 
 36 Theresa M. Glomb et al., Ambient Sexual Harassment: An Integrated Model of 
Antecedents and Consequences, 71 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 309, 321–
24 (1997) (reporting that women who experienced ambient sexual harassment reported 
negative psychological outcomes, even when they were not themselves directly subject to 
sexual harassment). 
 37 It appears that courts have used this requirement to limit the liability of employers 
and harassers for intentional infliction of emotional distress, even when the conduct at 
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The requirement that the harasser act intentionally or recklessly in causing 
that emotional harm or distress would also appear to be met by sexual 
harassing behavior directed by harassers against their targets. As the Supreme 
Court has recently indicated, under traditional tort law, “intent” means “that 
the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the 
consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”38 No matter what 
some harassers may contend, sexual harassment that is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to create a hostile and abusive working environment and therefore 
affect a term and condition of employment is not the product of innocent, 
clueless, or inadvertent behavior on the part of the harasser.39 It is difficult to 
imagine that courts would conclude, at least in the present legal climate, that 
harassers who coerce others into sexual conduct, who use degrading and 
derogatory sexual comments to refer to others, and who denigrate and mock 
the presumed sexual conduct of others, sometimes by simulating sexual acts 
with them, do not intend to inflict harm or at least are not aware that harm is 
substantially certain to occur.40 
                                                                                                                     
issue appears to meet the standard for extreme and outrageous behavior. In Smith v. 
Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff had alleged pervasive harassment 
by her immediate supervisor and the chief financial officer of the employer, including 
being touched on the leg, having sexual advances made, being grabbed and pulled onto a 
bed while in a hotel room on a business trip, being told to wear tighter clothes to improve 
sales, and being told to prostitute herself to obtain business for the company. Id. at 437‒38. 
Although the court of appeals acknowledged that under Louisiana law a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress could be based on “a pattern of deliberate, 
repeated harassment over a period of time,” the court held that the plaintiff had not suffered 
severe emotional distress because the depression, headaches, and loss of appetite that she 
suffered was not “unendurable.” Id. at 449–50. Similarly, in Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 
103 S.W.3d 671 (Ark. 2003), the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment by the owner of her 
employer, including numerous instances over a period of time in which he offered to buy 
the plaintiff a car if she had sex with him once a week, asked to touch her breasts, talked 
about his sexual experiences in “graphic detail,” made comments about her body, and 
asked her to meet him at hotels to engage in sexual activities. Id. at 673‒77. She was 
discharged shortly after she yelled at him and told him “to never speak dirty to [me] again.” 
Id. at 682 (alteration in original). The court held that while the owner’s conduct was 
“egregious,” the plaintiff did not prove that she suffered severe emotional distress that was 
such that no reasonable person could endure it, because “it appears that she did endure the 
alleged harassment for several years before she firmly rejected his alleged advances.” Id. at 
681–82. 
 38 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 n.3 (2011). 
 39 See, e.g., L. Camille Hébert, The Economic Implications of Sexual Harassment for 
Women, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 47–50 (1994) (discussing the economic causes of 
sexual harassment, including the fact that sexual harassment is often directed at women 
who are economically vulnerable and may be motivated by the frustration and hostility of 
men based on their decreasing advantages over women in the workplace). 
 40 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Compupay, Inc., 654 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding, in context of claim against insurance company for failure to 
provide a defense to sexual harassment claim by employee against insured employer, that 
there was no insurance coverage because of the intentional nature of the conduct and 
2014] CONCEPTUALIZING SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1355 
 
The more difficult question is whether sexual harassing behavior will be 
considered to constitute the type of “extreme and outrageous conduct” 
necessary to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
comments to the Restatement indicate that in order for conduct to meet this 
standard, both terms must be given effect: “this double limitation, ‘extreme 
and outrageous,’ requires both that the character of the conduct be outrageous 
and that the conduct be sufficiently unusual to be extreme.”41 Accordingly, if 
sexual harassment is viewed as fairly common behavior, it is possible that the 
courts might find it not to be extreme, regardless of how outrageous they find 
it to be.42 
The Restatements and the courts have tended to define the terms “extreme 
and outrageous” in colorful, but not very useful, language. In a comment to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the following guidance was offered on how to 
identify “extreme and outrageous” conduct: 
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to 
an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against 
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!”43 
The definition seems to have been softened in the current Restatement, if 
only by the deletion of certain adjectives and adverbs. That guidance now 
provides that liability for the tort exists “only if the conduct goes beyond the 
bounds of human decency such that it would be regarded as intolerable in a 
civilized community.”44 It seems possible that some uncivil conduct might be 
regarded as intolerable in a civilized community but not “utterly” intolerable 
in such a community. Similarly, some indecent conduct might be viewed as 
                                                                                                                     
stating that “[i]t can be reasoned that an act of discrimination or harassment, like an act of 
sexual abuse, has but one end: to harm the victim” and that “several courts have concluded 
that sexual harassment is deemed an intentional act as a matter of law”); Commercial 
Union Ins. Cos. v. Sky, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249, 253 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (rejecting a claim 
that an insurance company had to duty to defend a claim of sexual harassment in the 
context of employment and noting that “it strains the imagination to speculate how a 
pattern of sexual overtures and touching [could] be ‘accidental’”). 
 41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 
cmt. d (2012). 
 42 For example, a concurring justice in Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 
S.W.3d 438 (Tex. 2004) (Hecht, J., concurring), suggested that the sexually harassing 
behavior of the plaintiff’s supervisor, while “certainly objectionable, reprehensible, [and] at 
times even disgusting,” was “regrettably not that unusual.” Id. at 450‒51. In fact, Justice 
Hecht suggested that the existence of a statutory prohibition of sexual harassment in the 
workplace suggested the lack of unusualness of that activity. Id. at 450. 
 43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). 
 44 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (2012). 
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beyond the bounds of human decency, even if not “beyond all possible bounds 
of decency.” 
Some courts have added to the definition of extreme and outrageous 
conduct by invoking other concepts, such as dignity. The court in Weathersby 
v. Kentucky Fried Chicken45 indicated that behavior should be considered 
extreme and outrageous “only if the average member of the community must 
regard the defendant’s conduct as being a complete denial of the plaintiff’s 
dignity as a person.”46 
Some courts also appear to be defining extreme and outrageous conduct in 
a negative manner, by indicating the type of conduct that is not sufficient to be 
characterized as extreme and outrageous. For example, the court in GTE 
Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce47 noted that “insensitive or even rude behavior” and 
“mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other 
trivialities do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.”48 
Applying these definitions, it appears that at least some forms of sexual 
harassment, including some forms of verbal harassment, such as referring to 
women as “cunts,” as well as harassment consisting of unwelcome touching or 
fondling and sexual conduct that is particularly degrading and humiliating, 
would meet the definition of extreme and outrageous behavior. It would not be 
strange to say that such conduct, particularly in the context of the workplace, 
would be intolerable in a civilized society and beyond the bounds of human 
decency, as well as a denial of personal dignity. And it would be strange to 
call that conduct merely rude or insensitive behavior or to characterize it as 
petty or trivial. 
Courts have reached different conclusions on the issue of whether some 
forms of sexually harassing behavior might meet the standard of extreme and 
outrageous conduct. A California court of appeal in Fisher v. San Pedro 
Peninsula Hospital49 faced that issue in the context of a claim of sexual 
harassment by a nurse against her supervising physician, involving verbal 
sexual insults and offensive touching, including one incident in which he 
hugged her so tightly that he separated the cartilage in her ribs; she also 
complained of being subjected to an abusive environment, in which 
harassment of other women occurred in her presence, including the harasser 
pulling nurses onto his lap, grabbing women’s breasts and moving his hands 
toward their vaginal area, and moving his pelvic area while walking up closely 
                                                                                                                     
 45 Weathersby v. Ky. Fried Chicken Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 587 A.2d 569 (Md. Spec. App. 
1991), rev’d on other grounds, 607 A.2d 8 (Md. Ct. App. 1992). 
 46 Id. at 578; see also Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1179, 1189 
(D.N.H. 1992) (citing with approval definition of “extreme and outrageous conduct” from 
the Weathersby case). 
 47 GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999). 
 48 Id. at 612. 
 49 Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).  
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behind a woman.50 Although the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiff 
had not stated a claim for actionable sexual harassment because she had not 
pled that the harassment was pervasive, the court suggested that a claim of 
actionable sexual harassment would also succeed in stating an actionable claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Noting that sexual harassment 
was “often inherently oppressive and malicious” and that an employee had a 
fundamental right to a workplace free of discrimination, the court concluded 
that “by its very nature, sexual harassment in the work place is outrageous 
conduct as it exceeds all bounds of decency usually tolerated by a decent 
society.”51 
Other courts have also recognized the possibility that discrimination and 
harassment can constitute extreme and outrageous conduct in the context of 
the employment relationship, with some of those courts suggesting that the 
very fact of the employment relationship might make certain conduct of an 
employer toward an employee more likely to be found to be outrageous. In 
concluding that the allegations of imposition of discriminatory terms and 
conditions of employment with respect to male and female attorneys and the 
refusal to remove the female plaintiff from the supervision of the 
discriminating supervisor did not state a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, the court in Clemente v. State52 did note that courts are 
more likely to find conduct to be outrageous if inflicted within the context of 
the “special relationship” of employer and employee.53 The court indicated, 
however, that the plaintiff in that case had not shown the sort of “extraordinary 
transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct”:  
In the present case, no such extraordinary outrageous aggravating factors 
occurred. Plaintiff was not verbally, sexually, or physically abused or 
harassed. Nobody engaged in name-calling. She was not exposed to violence, 
nor was she repeatedly and viciously ridiculed. At most, she was subjected to 
an insensitive, mean-spirited supervisor who might have engaged in gender-
based, discriminatory treatment, but in this case, that treatment by itself did 
                                                                                                                     
 50 Id. at 846. The lower court had rejected the nurse’s claims against the physician, 
noting that the “world is full of offensive jackasses but there is no tort for being offensive.” 
Id. at 848 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51 Id. at 857–58. Some scholars also have taken this approach. For example, in Prosser 
and Keeton on the Law of Torts, the authors state that “[s]exual harassment on the job is 
undoubtedly an intentional infliction of emotional distress.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988). The Ohio 
Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Cox, No. 96CA622, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1346, at *1 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997), noted its agreement with Prosser and Keeton “that sexual 
harassment on the job is an intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Other courts, 
however, have disagreed. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon in 
Meagher v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1403, 1413 (D. Or. 1993), expressly rejected 
the plaintiffs’ contention that sexual harassment “is per se outrageous behavior.” 
 52 Clemente v. State, 206 P.3d 249 (Or. App. 2009). 
 53 Id. at 255. 
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not amount to “aggravated acts of persecution that a jury could find beyond 
all tolerable bounds of civilized behavior.”54 
Similarly, the court in Kanzler v. Renner55 sought to identify the factors 
relied on by courts to determine when sexually harassing conduct in the 
workplace was considered sufficiently outrageous to make out a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court indicated that one or 
more of the following factors seemed to cause the harassing conduct to cross 
the line into outrageousness: abuse of authority; repeating or recurring acts of 
harassment; unwelcome touching or physical contact, particularly of intimate 
areas of the body; or retaliation for refusing to submit to sexual conduct or for 
reporting that conduct.56  
Other courts have agreed that workplace harassment, including sexually 
and racially harassing conduct, can constitute sufficiently outrageous conduct 
to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.57 The court in 
Coleman v. Housing Authority of Americus58 refused to dismiss an employee’s 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against her former 
supervisor based on his sexual harassment of her, which took the form of 
calling her into his office to talk about sex, showing her cartoons of a sexual 
nature, asking her about her sexual activities with her husband, telling her 
racist and sexual jokes, trying to engage her in conversations about the sexual 
practices of black women, and making sexual remarks about her dress and her 
                                                                                                                     
 54 Id. 254–55 (emphasis omitted). The court indicated that the unlawfulness of the 
conduct was relevant, but not dispositive, in determining whether the conduct was 
actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 255 n.3. 
 55 Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1997). 
 56 Id. at 1341–43. The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations that a police officer 
with whom she had previously had a friendly relationship followed her home in his squad 
car and parked near her home, came into the dispatch room and sat close to her for long 
periods of time while she was working, put his arm around her and pulled her close to his 
body, and followed her into a utility closet and attacked her could be construed as 
outrageous, making summary judgment for the police officer inappropriate. Id. at 1344; see 
also Salvatore v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, No. 98 Civ. 2450 (LAP), 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15551, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 1999) (distinguishing between claims of sexual 
harassment for which claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are allowed to 
proceed and those that are not and noting that successful claims generally involve an 
“unrelenting campaign of day in, day out harassment or that the harassment was 
accompanied by physical threats”) (citation omitted)). 
 57 See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 217 (Cal. 1970) (holding that 
complaint stated a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress when racial slurs 
were used against the African-American employee in connection with his discharge); 
Sawicka v. Catena, 912 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (holding that the 
plaintiffs’ allegations that they were secretly recorded while using the restroom by a video 
camera installed by the owner of the employer stated a claim of creation of a hostile work 
environment on the basis of sex and intentional infliction of emotional distress, given that 
the action was “unquestionably outrageous and extreme”). 
 58 Coleman v. Hous. Auth. of Americus, 381 S.E.2d 303 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
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mannerisms. The court noted that even if some of the acts would not by 
themselves constitute the sort of conduct that “would naturally humiliate, 
embarrass, frighten, or outrage” the plaintiff, the repetition of those actions 
over her protests were sufficient.59 The court noted that conduct of this type 
was particularly likely to cross the line into outrageousness in the workplace 
context, in which the employee is under the control of the employer: 
The workplace is not a free zone in which the duty not to engage in wilfully 
and wantonly causing emotional distress through the use of abusive or 
obscene language does not exist. Actually, by its very nature, it provides an 
environment more prone to such occurrences because it provides a captive 
victim who may fear reprisal for complaining, so that the injury is 
exacerbated by repetition, and it presents a hierarchy of structured 
relationships which cannot easily be avoided.60 
Courts have also held that an employer’s action in refusing to respond to 
or take remedial action with respect to an employee’s complaints of sexual 
harassment by a supervisory employee can constitute sufficiently outrageous 
behavior to state a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against 
the employer. The plaintiff in Ford v. Revlon, Inc.61 brought numerous 
complaints of verbal and physical sexual harassment by her direct supervisor 
to the attention of her employer; the harassment consisted of repeated 
assertions that he was going to “fuck her” and a physical altercation in which 
he grabbed her and put her in a chokehold while he ran his hand over her 
breasts, stomach, and between her legs. For over a year, her pleas for help 
were ignored, in spite of the fact that she reported her fear of him and the 
distress it was causing her. The supervisor finally received a letter of censure 
and was terminated shortly after the plaintiff attempted suicide.62 The court 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Id. at 305–06.  
 60 Id. at 306. It is true that not all courts have reached the same conclusion about the 
likelihood of being able to establish the existence of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress in the context of the workplace. The court in Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 
F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988), indicated that “it must be recognized that it is extremely rare 
to find conduct in the employment context that will rise to the level of outrageousness 
necessary to provide a basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.” Similarly, the state court in Wilkinson v. Hobbs Assocs., LLC, No. CV-
075007485, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1849, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 20, 2011), 
indicated that such a claim would be difficult to establish because “individuals in the 
workplace reasonably should expect to experience some level of emotional distress, even 
significant emotional distress, as a result of conduct in the workplace.” The cases that 
suggest that the existence of an imbalance of power in the workplace creates a “special 
relationship” that makes the claim easier, rather than harder, to establish seem better 
reasoned than those whose approach is essentially “that’s life.” See Regina Austin, 
Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988). 
 61 Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987). 
 62 Id. at 581–83. 
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agreed that the employer could be held liable for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, in spite of the fact that the jury had not found the actual 
harasser liable for that tort. The court found the employer’s action—or 
inaction—to be independently tortious and “extreme or outrageous”: 
Ford made numerous Revlon managers aware of Braun’s activities at 
company functions. Ford did everything that could be done, both within the 
announced policies of Revlon and without, to bring this matter to Revlon’s 
attention. Revlon ignored her and the situation she faced, dragging the matter 
out for months and leaving Ford without redress. Here is sufficient evidence 
that Revlon acted outrageously.63 
The court also agreed that the employer either intended to cause the 
plaintiff emotional distress or that its reckless disregard of the supervisor’s 
conduct made it “nearly certain” that emotional distress would in fact occur.64 
Some courts seemed to have defined the line between conduct that will be 
considered extreme and outrageous and conduct that will not be found to meet 
that standard in terms of what type of conduct employees in the workplace 
should be required to accept.65 And for these courts, this standard seems to be 
an evolving one. For example, in Retherford v. AT&T Communications,66 the 
court rejected the contention of the plaintiff’s co-workers that their retaliatory 
actions toward her after she complained of sexual harassment by a female co-
worker could not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to state 
a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress; that conduct had 
included what the court termed “months of persecution,” including shadowing 
her movements, intimidation by threatening looks and remarks, and 
manipulations that made her work much more stressful.67 The court held that 
accepting the defendants’ assertions to the contrary would be a “travesty” 
because “sexual harassment is simply unacceptable in today’s society”:68 
It is worth stating forcefully that any other conclusion would amount to an 
intolerable refusal to recognize that our society has ceased seeing sexual 
harassment in the work place as a playful inevitability that should be taken in 
good spirits and has awakened to the fact that sexual harassment has a 
corrosive effect on those who engage in it as well as those who are subjected 
                                                                                                                     
 63 Id. at 585. 
 64 Id. at 585–86. 
 65 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1179, 1189 (D.N.H. 1992) 
(concluding that the plaintiff’s allegations that her two supervisors made sexual comments 
to her, attempted to engage her in sexual conversations, and sat close to her in a sexually 
suggestive manner were not “acceptable sexual banter,” but “ongoing, unadorned 
discrimination of an inherently offensive nature, of a kind one should not be expected to 
encounter as part of daily life”). 
 66 Retherford v. AT&T Commc’ns, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). 
 67 Id. at 978. 
 68 Id. 
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to it and that such harassment has far more to do with the abusive exercise of 
one person’s power over another than it does with sex.69 
Other judges, on the other hand, have suggested that sexually harassing 
conduct does not generally meet the requirement of extreme and outrageous 
conduct necessary to establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
that only the most serious of such conduct, such as repeated intimidating and 
physically threatening harassment, should be held to meet that standard. That 
was the position of the concurring justice in Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. 
Zeltwanger,70 in which an employee had recovered for sexual harassment by 
her supervisor, consisting of sexual comments about her, commentary about 
his sexual experiences, and apparent retaliation for complaining about that 
conduct. That justice sought to distinguish the conduct in that case from what 
she viewed as more serious and more physically threatening conduct in 
another case in which intentional infliction of emotional distress had been 
found:71 
Undoubtedly, most conduct that would support a sexual-harassment claim is 
outrageous and intolerable, presumably the very reason the Legislature made 
such conduct statutorily actionable. But only when such behavior repeatedly 
becomes so forceful and intimidating that a reasonable person would feel 
immediately threatened or afraid can a court conclude with sufficient 
certainty that the actor intended to cause severe emotional distress or that 
severe emotional distress was the primary risk of the actor’s conduct.72 
One cannot help but wonder how the justice distinguishes between the 
“outrageous and intolerable” conduct that she views as sufficient to be 
outlawed, but not tortious, and the “extreme and outrageous” conduct that is 
sufficiently tortious. One might also wonder why only fear or threat counts as 
severe emotional distress, but not humiliation or despondency. 
                                                                                                                     
 69 Id. (citation omitted). 
 70 See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 454 (Tex. 2004) 
(O’Neill, J., concurring). 
 71 That other case was GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999). 
The plaintiffs in that case, three female employees, obtained a jury verdict for damages for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on evidence that their male supervisor 
had “yelled, screamed, cursed, and even ‘charged’ at them”—bending his head down, 
putting his arms by his sides, balling his hands into fists, and walking quickly toward or 
lunging at the employees, stopping close to their faces. Id. at 609, 613. He also used 
profanity toward them, using the words “fuck” and “motherfucker.” Id. at 613. One 
employee testified that the supervisor would call her into his office and stare at her for as 
long as thirty minutes at a time and she was not allowed to leave until she was dismissed. 
Id. at 614. In upholding the jury verdict, the court noted that the supervisor’s action was 
intentionally intimidating and humiliating. Id. at 617. 
 72 Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 144 S.W.3d at 454 (O’Neill, J., concurring). 
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IV. THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF CONCEPTUALIZING SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT AS A DIGNITARY TORT 
At least some claims of sexual harassment would appear to fit quite 
comfortably within the elements of a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and, as demonstrated above, some courts have shown a 
willingness to find that sexually harassing conduct violates tort law under that 
theory. But the conclusion that sexual harassment can be conceptualized as a 
dignitary tort does not answer the question of whether it should be. 
Determining the desirability of framing sexual harassment in this way requires 
the assessment of the advantages and disadvantages to this approach, both 
practical and theoretical. 
There are some potential advantages of a conclusion that sexual 
harassment constitutes a dignitary tort, such as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. One such potential advantage is that if, under tort theory, 
sexual harassment does not have to be shown to be discriminatory in order to 
be actionable, some forms of sexual harassment that courts now find not to be 
unlawful may be found to be actionable. For example, courts routinely find 
sexually harassing behavior directed at gay men and lesbians to be outside the 
scope of Title VII on the grounds that that conduct is motivated not by the 
target’s sex or gender but because of his or her sexual orientation.73 Similarly, 
some courts have concluded that sexually explicit and degrading behavior 
directed at women is not unlawful because it was motivated not by the 
woman’s sex or gender but because of some personal characteristic that the 
harasser found objectionable.74 To the extent that conceptualization of sexual 
harassment as a dignitary tort eliminates the requirement that the harassment 
be shown to have been discriminatorily motivated, the range of sexual 
harassment found to be actionable might be thereby broadened. 
Another potential advantage of conceptualizing sexual harassment as a 
dignitary tort is to impose liability on all parties responsible for the sexually 
harassing behavior, not just the employer. Because Title VII has been 
interpreted to impose liability for violation of its provisions only on employers 
                                                                                                                     
 73 See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761–66 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(affirming the district court’s dismissal of male plaintiff’s claim of sex discrimination, 
which alleged pervasive harassment, including simulated anal intercourse, on grounds that 
the plaintiff’s claim was one of sexual orientation, not sex, discrimination); see also 
Chrouser v. DePaul Univ., No. 95 C 7363, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8179, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 
May 20, 1998) (rejecting female plaintiff’s contention that being called a “breeder” by her 
lesbian supervisor was based on sex rather than her heterosexual sexual orientation). 
 74 See, e.g., Wieland v. Dep’t of Transp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1019 (N.D. Ind. 2000) 
(summarily concluding that gender-based hostility was not a factor when female employee 
was called a “bitch” and a “slut” by another woman); Reyes v. McDonald Pontiac-GMC 
Truck, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 614, 616–18 (D.N.J. 1998) (concluding on summary judgment 
that woman who was called a “bitch” and “Miss Fucking Queen Bee” had not 
demonstrated that conduct was directed at her because of gender rather than frustration and 
anger). 
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and not on individuals employed by the employer, in many cases the 
individual primarily responsible for the harassing conduct will face no direct 
economic consequences for his or her actions. Not only does this lack of direct 
economic consequences affect the incentives for those individuals to avoid 
engaging in harassing conduct, but some courts have shown a reluctance to 
impose liability for sexually harassing behavior on “innocent” employers,75 
when the persons seen as directly responsible for the harassment do not face 
liability. This means, of course, that the most “innocent” individuals—the 
employee or employees targeted by or subjected to sexually harassing 
behavior—are the ones made to bear the burden of that conduct, by having to 
endure the harassment itself and by being deprived of a remedy for the 
economic, emotional, and other consequences of that harassment. It is possible 
that courts reluctant to hold employers liable for sexually harassing conduct 
might be more willing to impose liability on the direct perpetrators of that 
conduct. 
Another advantage of conceptualizing sexual harassment as a dignitary 
tort, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, is that the limitation on 
compensatory and punitive statutorily imposed by Title VII76 would not apply 
in a tort action. Accordingly, employees who are subjected to sexual 
harassment would be more likely to obtain full recovery for the harm that they 
suffer based on the sexually harassing conduct, by seeking the full measure of 
their economic damages, including backpay and frontpay, from culpable 
employers in a Title VII action, while seeking full recovery for psychological 
and emotional harm in a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
There are, however, a number of potential disadvantages of 
conceptualizing sexual harassment as a dignitary tort, in particular as an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under existing sexual harassment 
law under Title VII, not all conduct that might be viewed as sexual harassment 
is unlawful, because existing case law requires that an employee establish that 
sexually harassing behavior not only be motivated by sex or gender, but also 
that the harassment be sufficiently “severe or pervasive . . . to create an 
                                                                                                                     
 75 See, e.g., McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 772–74 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(refusing to hold employer vicariously liable for sexual harassment by supervisory 
employee when employer promptly responded to the plaintiff’s complaint of harassment). 
The court of appeals in McCurdy indicated that “[i]t is a fair question to ask who should 
bear the responsibility for a single incident of supervisor sexual harassment, an innocent 
employee like McCurdy or an employer like the [Arkansas State Police,] which effectively 
stops the harassment after it learns about it,” but concluded that the law did not allow the 
employer to be held liable, in spite of controlling Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. 
Id. at 772. 
 76 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2012) places a cap on the recovery of compensatory and 
punitive damages for actions under Title VII, based on the size of the employer, with 
damages limited for each complaining party to $50,000 for employers with between fifteen 
and 100 employees, to $100,000 for employers with between 101 and 200 employees, to 
$200,000 for employers with between 201 and 500 employees, and to $300,000 for 
employers with more than 500 employees. 
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objectively hostile or abusive work environment.”77 This has proved not to be 
an easy standard to meet; there are numerous cases in which courts have 
summarily rejected the sexual harassment claims of employees because the 
objectionable and abusive conduct to which they were subjected was not bad 
enough.78 And this problem is likely to be substantially worsened by the 
requirement that the harassment be “extreme and outrageous,” as required by 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. There have been a 
number of cases in which courts have concluded that conduct that is sufficient 
to meet the requirements for a sexual harassment claim fall short of the type of 
extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to state a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.79 As one court explained: “statutory 
discrimination occurs at a much lower threshold of inappropriate conduct than 
the threshold required for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress,” and “the fact that there is a Title VII hostile environment does not 
necessarily support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”80 
In addition to these practical effects on the ability of employees who have 
been subjected to sexual harassment to establish the unlawfulness of that 
conduct and to recover damages for the harm inflicted on them, there are also 
substantial theoretical issues raised by the way in which sexually harassing 
behavior is conceptualized. These theoretical issues may suggest the need for 
caution with respect to the conceptualization of sexual harassment as a 
                                                                                                                     
 77 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
 78 See, e.g., Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 664, 674–76 (E.D. Ark. 1998) 
(holding that single incident in which high-ranking public official allegedly exposed his 
erect penis and asked low-level employee to “kiss it” was not sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to constitute actionable hostile work environment); Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff 
Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff’d on other grounds, 913 F.2d 456 
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that sexual advances made to the plaintiff by her direct supervisor 
and an incident in which her supervisor had fondled her breast fell “far short” of 
establishing the existence of a hostile work environment). 
 79 See, e.g., Pascal v. Storage Tech Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 191, 213–15 (D. Conn. 
2001) (refusing to grant summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment 
but rejecting on summary judgment her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and noting that just because the conduct directed at the plaintiff was unlawful did not mean 
that it was sufficiently “egregious or oppressive conduct within the contemplation of this 
tort”); Piech v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 841 F. Supp. 825, 831–32 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(refusing to dismiss claim of sexual harassment but dismissing claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and noting that “[c]laims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress in the employment setting have generally involved circumstances 
beyond what can be considered a typical employment dispute better addressed in a Title 
VII or equivalent suit”). 
 80 Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424, 431 (D. Ariz. 1992). The court, however, 
did agree that one incident of sexual harassment involving the plaintiff—a co-worker’s 
action of poking the plaintiff twice in the buttock with a plastic fork and indicating that he 
was checking whether “‘the meat’ was done”—was sufficiently egregious to preclude 
summary judgment on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. 
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dignitary tort, regardless of the immediate practical effects that such a 
conceptualization may have on the claims of individual employees. 
As a general matter, discrimination is viewed as a group harm, even when 
it is individuals who are subjected to discriminatory behavior.81 That is, in 
order to establish that employees have been subjected to discriminatory 
conduct, it is necessary to show that the treatment to which they were 
subjected was motivated by, or had an adverse effect on them because of,82 
their membership in a protected group. Accordingly, when a woman or a man 
seeks to establish the existence of sexual harassment as discrimination, she or 
he must generally establish that she or he was targeted for harassment not 
based on personal characteristics unique to her or him, but because of 
characteristics associated with her or his sex or gender. That is, a woman who 
is targeted for harassment because she is personally disliked cannot establish 
the existence of discriminatory harassment, while a woman who is targeted for 
the precise same conduct because she is viewed as too aggressive for a 
woman, not sufficiently feminine, otherwise non-compliant with gender 
stereotypes, or just because she is a woman should be able to establish the 
existence of discriminatory harassment.83 Similarly, a man who is targeted for 
harassment because he is viewed as insufficiently masculine or otherwise does 
not act as a “real man” should act should be able to establish the existence of 
discriminatory harassment.84 
                                                                                                                     
 81 The United States Supreme Court’s most clear articulation of the theories of 
cognizable discrimination under Title VII is in its decision in Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). There, the Court made clear that both the disparate 
treatment theory and the disparate impact theory are based on claims of individuals either 
being treated or affected in certain ways because of the protected groups to which they 
belong. Id. 
 82 Sexual harassment is generally viewed as a form of intentional discrimination under 
Title VII, as a violation of the statute under what is known as the disparate treatment 
theory, in which the harassment is shown to have motivated by sex or gender. I have 
argued elsewhere that sexual harassment might also be established under the other 
principal theory of discrimination, the disparate impact theory, under which even a facially 
neutral rule or practice can be unlawful if it has a disproportionate negative effect on 
members of a protected group. See generally L. Camille Hébert, The Disparate Impact of 
Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341, 383‒95 (2005).  
 83 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235, 251 (1989). The Court 
recognized claim of sex discrimination by a woman who was denied partnership in 
accounting firm, in part because she was viewed as “macho” and not sufficiently feminine 
and because she “overcompensated for being a woman.” Id. at 235. A plurality of the Court 
noted that “[a]s for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they match the stereotype 
associated with their group.” Id. at 251. 
 84 See EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 449–54 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(recognizing a claim for sexual harassment based on sexual stereotyping brought by 
heterosexual man, who was called “pussy,” “princess,” and “faggot” and was subject to 
simulated anal intercourse, in part because he brought Wet Ones to work to use instead of 
toilet paper, and noting that supervisor who conducted harassment admitted that the 
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The focus of the anti-discrimination laws on wrongs against protected 
groups leads to a recognition that sexual harassment is not just a wrong against 
an individual woman, but against women generally. This “group” focus 
suggests that harassers choose their targets not because of the personal 
characteristics of the particular target, but rather because of their sex or 
gender,85 for example, because of gender hostility, a desire for sexual or 
workplace dominance, or sexual stereotyping. And to the extent that 
recognizing sexual harassment as group harm focuses on the systematic nature 
of sexually harassing behavior, sometimes directed toward men but normally 
directed toward women, it is easier for the courts to see sexual harassment in 
the workplace as conduct that not merely offends the sensibilities of women, 
but that adversely affects their workplace opportunities.86 
Conversely, the type of harm that underlies dignitary torts in general, and 
a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in particular, appears to 
be individualized harm.87 Tort law has been described as “defin[ing] duties to 
refrain from injuring (or to protect from injury) that are owed by certain 
persons to others: duties that, when breached, constitute wrongs to those 
others, as opposed to wrongs to the world”88 and it has been said that:  
Tortious wrongdoing always involves an interference with one of a set of 
individual interests that are significant enough aspects of a person’s well-
                                                                                                                     
plaintiff’s use of Wet Ones was “feminine” and “kind of gay,” even though he testified that 
he did not believe that the plaintiff was gay). 
 85 It appears to have been a desire for the effects of this “group” focus that at least 
partially motivated one of the earliest and foundational scholarly arguments for treating 
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. Professor Catharine MacKinnon, in her 
book Sexual Harassment of Working Women, explains: 
[I]f one shows that sexual harassment in employment systemically occurs between the 
persons and under the conditions that an analysis of it as discrimination suggests—that 
is, as a function of sex as gender—one undercuts the view that it occurs because of 
some unique chemistry between particular (or aberrant) individuals. That sexual 
harassment does occur to a large and diverse population of women supports an 
analysis that it occurs because of their group characteristic, that is, sex. 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 27 (1979). 
 86 There is considerable evidence that the existence of sexual harassment in the 
workplace does adversely affect the work experiences and employment opportunities of 
women, often resulting in decreased productivity, increased absenteeism, and job loss. See, 
e.g., U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: 
TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 23–27 (1995) (discussing the costs of 
sexual harassment to both the federal government and employees in terms of lost 
productivity, job turnover, and use of sick leave or other forms of leave). 
 87 Catharine MacKinnon argued for the inadequacy of tort law to address issues of 
sexual harassment in the workplace precisely because of the focus of tort law on individual 
harm. MACKINNON, supra note 85, at 171–72. 
 88 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
917, 918 (2010) (emphasis in original). 
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being to warrant the imposition of a duty on others not to interfere with the 
interest in certain ways, notwithstanding the liberty restriction inherent in 
such a duty imposition.89  
Accordingly, tort law is generally deemed to address issues concerning private 
wrongs or harms to individuals.90 
Within the area of tort law, dignitary torts seem particularly focused on 
issues of individual harm. The dignitary torts of defamation, invasion of 
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are said to address 
behavior that “invades an individual’s sense of worth and dignity” and to 
protect “interests in individual personality.”91 It is true that the term “dignity” 
is used in a number of legal contexts to describe different types of harms, 
some collective and some individual. For example, the term “dignity” is used 
to describe interests in equality, as well as interests in autonomy and freedom 
from humiliation;92 violations of equality would seem to count as collective 
harms, while violations of autonomy and humiliating treatment seem more like 
individual harms. However, the manner in which the term “dignity” is used in 
the legal systems that prohibit sexual harassment based on harms to dignity 
appears to refer to the notion of freedom from humiliation,93 a harm that seems 
to be focused on harm to individuals. 
As described above, when courts ask whether an employer, an employer’s 
representative, or even a co-worker intended to inflict emotional distress on an 
employee, the inquiry is generally individualized, with respect to the existence 
of intent to harm, the nature of the conduct aimed at the employee, and the 
degree of emotional distress caused by that conduct.94 The courts considering 
such claims do not generally ask why an employee was targeted for particular 
conduct, nor is the motivation for that conduct necessarily considered an 
aggravating factor in judging the objectionableness of that conduct. And courts 
                                                                                                                     
 89 Id. at 937. Interestingly, these authors, while seeming to emphasize the individual 
focus of tort law, also assert that workplace sexual harassment counts as a tort, simply 
noting that the claim involves “an assertion that the defendant has committed a legal wrong 
against the plaintiff,” without describing the nature of that wrong. See id. at 939. 
 90 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 51, § 1 (“There remains a body of law [which] 
is directed toward the compensation of individuals, rather than the public, for losses which 
they have suffered within the scope of their legally recognized interests generally, rather 
than one interest only, where the law considers that compensation is required. This is the 
law of torts.”). 
 91 Cristina Carmody Tilley, Rescuing Dignitary Torts from the Constitution, 78 
BROOK. L. REV. 65, 69–70 (2012). 
 92 See discussion of various meanings given to the term “dignity” in different legal 
contexts in Hébert, supra note 21, at 33–36. 
 93 Id. at 35–36; see also MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 127 
(2012) (“[T]he idea that humiliation or degradation counts as a violation of human dignity 
has a very good claim to be universal even though the practices by which that may be 
expressed vary.”). 
 94 See supra Part III. 
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require that the particular employee show the requisite degree of emotional 
harm, rather than focusing on the way in which the conduct is harmful to the 
interests of women generally. 
Similarly, the very nature of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress frames the injury of such conduct as causing offense to the dignity of 
women and in causing them emotional harm, rather than harm to their 
employment opportunities. Viewed in this way, sexual harassment can be seen 
as a harm to women’s dignitary or psychological health that just happens to 
occur in the workplace, rather than as harm to women’s workplace status or 
opportunities in the workplace, which may also cause them emotional and 
psychological distress. 
But one wonders whether the dichotomy between conceptualizing sexual 
harassment as a form of discrimination and conceptualizing sexual harassment 
as a dignitary tort is inevitable. Perhaps it is possible to conceptualize sexual 
harassment as a dignitary tort without losing the notion that sexual harassment 
also constitutes discrimination. Perhaps it is possible to recognize that sexual 
harassment is both a group harm—harming the interests of workplace equality 
for women—and an individual harm—subjecting the women (and men) who 
are targeted for degrading and humiliating treatment to a violation of their 
dignity. 
Courts might simply conclude that both types of harms occur at the same 
time, without necessarily being influenced by the other. That is, when 
employees are targeted for sexually harassing conduct because of gender 
hostility, a gender-linked desire for dominance, sexual stereotyping, or 
otherwise because of sex,95 courts might conclude that those employees have 
been discriminated against by having workplace opportunities and benefits 
conditioned on or affected by that sexually harassing conduct, such that a 
violation of Title VII has occurred. Liability for such discrimination would, 
under prevailing law, be visited upon the employer, either on grounds of 
vicarious liability or negligence.96 But these courts might also conclude that 
the harassment to which the employees have been subjected was outrageous 
conduct intended to cause, and that did cause, severe emotional distress to 
those employees. Liability for this tortious action would be visited upon the 
                                                                                                                     
 95 Although I have grave doubts about the conclusion of courts that sexual harassment 
is frequently motivated by sexual desire on the part of harassers, courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have concluded that sexual harassment motivated by sexual desire meets 
the “because of . . . sex” requirement of Title VII. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998). 
 96 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (imposing vicarious 
liability on employers for sexually harassing conduct by supervisors, subject to an 
affirmative defense in cases in which no tangible employment action is taken); Vance v. 
Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441–43 (2013) (adopting a narrow definition of who 
constitutes a supervisor and making clear that employer liability for sexually harassing 
conduct by non-supervisory employees is based on negligence). 
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individual engaged in the harassment and perhaps on the employer who 
employs that harasser.97  
But courts might conclude that the discriminatory nature and the tortious 
nature of unlawful sexually harassing conduct are not wholly unconnected to 
each other, in that discrimination itself might be viewed as causing harm to the 
dignity of those subjected to it.98 That is, sexual harassment might be found to 
meet the requirements of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
because sexual harassment constitutes a deprivation of workplace equality. 
Courts might determine that sexual harassment constitutes outrageous conduct 
precisely because of its discriminatory nature—that the sex- and gender-
related harms that it inflicts on women (and some men) subjected to it are 
particularly outrageous. And courts might conclude that when woman and men 
are subjected to sexually harassing conduct, with that conduct chosen as a 
particularly harmful way to humiliate and degrade them, they are more likely 
to suffer extreme emotional distress, a fact that is unlikely to escape their 
harassers. 
It would not seem strange for courts to conclude that sexually harassing 
conduct is outrageous precisely because of its discriminatory nature—when 
employees are targeted for humiliating and degrading conduct not because of 
the random whim99 of their supervisors and co-workers, but because of their 
gender or sex, including their sexual orientation or gender identity.100 If 
                                                                                                                     
 97 For a detailed analysis of the rules of employer liability for the torts of its 
employees, see Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex Exception, 48 
VAL. U. L. REV. 133, 141–55 (2013). Professor Chamallas recognizes that many courts 
have shown reluctance to hold employers liable for the sexually-related torts of their 
employees, even when vicarious liability would likely be imposed for non-sexually related 
torts. See id. at 141‒49. In any event, courts have been generally willing to hold employers 
liable in connection with employees’ intentional torts when the employer can be shown to 
have been negligent in allowing the conduct to occur or facilitating such conduct. See id. at 
177. 
 98 In her book, Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions, and the Worth of the Human 
Person, Erin Daly argues that “[e]quality jurisprudence implicates dignity because rank 
discrimination violates dignity” because conferring benefits and burdens based on the 
category “to which a person belongs both limits his or her ability to define him- or herself 
and constricts his or her individuation by treating him or her solely as a member of a 
class.” ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE 
HUMAN PERSON 35 (2013). 
 99 The continued persistence of the doctrine of employment at will in the employment 
law of the United States suggests that employer actions motivated by random or even 
whimsical reasons are not considered outrageous behavior. 
 100 While sexual orientation and gender identity are not currently provided the same 
protections in many jurisdictions as are other characteristics, such as sex and race, there does 
seem to be a growing national consensus that discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
and gender identity, including in employment, is unacceptable in a civilized society. National 
opinion polls suggest that a growing number of Americans believe that individuals should not 
be subject to discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. Gay and 
Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/Gay-Lesbian-Rights.aspx (last 
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outrageous conduct is defined as that which employees should not be required 
to accept in the context of the workplace, then it would appear that 
discrimination on the basis of sex, like racial discrimination, would be a 
candidate for characterization of outrageous conduct.101 After all, Title VII 
itself declares that discrimination on the basis of sex is unacceptable in the 
workplace, and the evolving legal standards under that statute now make clear 
that sexual harassment constitutes a form of sex discrimination.102 And Title 
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination appears to be evolving so that gender 
identity and sexual orientation may well fall within that prohibition; the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, charged with the enforcement of the 
statute, currently takes the position that discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity and sexual orientation falls within the statutory prohibition.103 
Nor would it be strange for courts to recognize that sexually harassing 
conduct in the workplace that discriminatorily affects women’s employment 
                                                                                                                     
visited June 17, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8FUZ-N73V (in response to the question of 
whether “homosexuals should or should not have equal rights in terms of job opportunities,” 
89% of respondents indicated that such equal rights should exist in May 2008, compared with 
56% in June 1977); see also New HRC Study Shows That American Public Strongly Supports 
Federal Non-Discrimination Protections, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/new-hrc-study-shows-that-american-public-strongly-supports-
federal-non-disc, archived at http://perma.cc/DD26-NHYW (reporting results of a poll of 
registered voters conducted in June 2014, indicating that 63% of those surveyed favor a federal 
law protecting gay and transgender persons from employment discrimination). The growing 
protection at the state and federal level against discrimination against sexual minorities 
suggests a growing disapproval of discrimination on these grounds. See Christi Parsons & 
Michael A. Memoli, Obama to Sign Executive Order Curbing Discrimination Against Gays, 
L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2014, 11:07 PM), http://latimes.com/nation/la-na-obama-discrimination-
20140617-story.html#page=1, archived at http://perma.cc/Y2XK-UBF5 (announcing 
President Obama’s plan to sign executive order forbidding federal contractors from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity and discussing state laws 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 101 See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 102 Professor Martha Chamallas has argued for the reformation of tort law, including 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, by applying concepts from Title VII 
to tort law, including the notions that a pattern of harassment can create employment-
related harms equal to those imposed by other work-related disadvantages and that sexual 
harassment is not motivated principally by sexual attraction but is used for other purposes, 
including maintaining gender hierarchy in the workplace. See Martha Chamallas, 
Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2115, 2171–75 (2007). 
 103 See EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (Apr. 20, 2012) 
(Macy v. Holder) (articulating the EEOC’s position that discrimination against a person 
because he or she is transgendered, also known as gender identity discrimination, 
constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex); EEOC Decision No. 0720130012, 2013 WL 
2146756, at *3‒4 (May 7, 2013) (Culp v. Napolitano) (finding that allegation of sexual 
orientation discrimination was a claim of sex discrimination because supervisor was 
motivated by his attitudes about sex stereotypes that women should only have relationships 
with men).  
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opportunities inflicts a particularly harmful type of emotional or psychological 
harm.104 Although women are achieving gains in the employment sector, their 
positions relative to men still remain precarious in a number of workplaces. 
Accordingly, for women seeking to gain acceptance in the workplace, it is 
particularly important for them to be accepted as competent workers; being 
treated in a sexual manner in such a context inflicts serious harm upon their 
professional interests.105 Accordingly, being subjected to sexual harassment in 
a setting in which it is particularly important to be perceived in a professional 
manner may inflict more serious emotional harm.106 Employees subjected to 
sexual harassment might be viewed as more likely to suffer extreme emotional 
distress when not only their dignity is attacked, but also when those actions 
deprive them of workplace opportunities. 
Finally, just as courts have been able to recognize that sexual harassment 
can be intentional action aimed at disadvantaging women in the workplace and 
harming their employment opportunities, it seems likely that courts will 
recognize that when harassers choose to humiliate and degrade women 
through sexual conduct, the harassers are not unaware of the consequences of 
their actions. It is true that not all harassers so clearly articulate their motives 
as did the harasser in LeLouis v. Western Directory Co.,107 who reportedly told 
his target that if she didn’t like the harassment, she could leave and “don’t let 
the door hit you in the ass on the way out.”108 But it is likely that harassers 
                                                                                                                     
 104 Research suggests that psychological harm from instances of workplace uncivility 
may be more substantial when that treatment has a gendered or sexual nature to it, perhaps 
suggesting that discrimination itself can be shown to be psychologically harmful. See 
Sandy Lim & Lilia M. Cortina, Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace: The 
Interface and Impact of General Incivility and Sexual Harassment, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
483, 493 (2005). 
 105 See Hébert, supra note 82, at 388–91 (discussing the disparate negative effect of 
sexual harassment on women, particularly the ways in which women are more harmed by 
sexualization of the workplace than are men and the tendency of women to be marginalized 
as workers when they are treated like sexual objects). 
 106 In the case of Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. 
Fla. 1991), Dr. Susan Fiske offered expert testimony concerning the differential effects of 
sexually harassing conduct on men and women, including emotional effects. Id. at 1502. 
The district court summarized her testimony as follows:  
Nonprofessional ambience imposes much harsher effects on women than on men. 
The general principle, as stated by Dr. Fiske, is “when sex comes into the workplace, 
women are profoundly affected . . . in their job performance and in their ability to do 
their jobs without being bothered by it.” The effects encompass emotional upset, 
reduced job satisfaction, the deterrence of women from seeking jobs or promotions, 
and an increase of women quitting jobs, getting transferred, or being fired because of 
the sexualization of the workplace. By contrast, the effect of the sexualization of the 
workplace is “vanishingly small for men.” 
Id. at 1505 (citations omitted). 
 107 LeLouis v. Western Directory Co., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Or. 2001). 
 108 Id. at 1217. 
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understand that if they direct sexually offensive conduct at their co-workers 
and subordinates, that conduct is likely to affect both the workplace 
environment and the emotional welfare of those targets, if only because those 
harassers likely have witnessed the effect of such behavior before.109 
An example of the awareness of the consequences on their actions on the 
part of harassers is graphically illustrated by the case of Robinson v. 
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,110 in which the female plaintiff complained about 
the presence of pictures and drawings depicting nude and partially nude 
women in suggestive or submissive positions or engaged in sexual activity in 
the workplace, indicating that she found then degrading and humiliating. The 
response to her complaints was an increase in the number of pictures in the 
workplace and their placement in places where she would be sure to see them, 
such as her toolbox, as well as the painting of the words “Men Only” on the 
doors of the shipfitter’s trailer.111 It is hard to imagine that these harassers 
were unaware that their discriminatory conduct was not only exclusionary, but 
also degrading and humiliating, particularly when they had been told by their 
target that it was.112 
                                                                                                                     
 109 Although there are undoubtedly some harassers who engage in harassing conduct 
only a single time, most harassers appear to be recidivists, not only engaging in a pattern of 
harassment against single targets, but also harassing multiple targets. See, e.g., Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (recognizing that president of company targeted the 
plaintiff and several other women at the company by asking them to retrieve coins from his 
front pants pocket, throwing objects on the ground and asking them to pick them up, and 
making sexual comments about their clothing); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 
60–61 (1986) (recounting that the plaintiff had testified that Taylor, who repeatedly 
fondled her and forcibly raped her, also touched and fondled other women at the bank). In 
addition, in most of the cases described in this Article, the harassment consisted of repeated 
behavior focused on the plaintiff as well as on other employees in the workplace, who were 
usually women. 
 110 Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1490, 1498–1501. 
 111 See id. at 1490, 1498, 1500–01. 
 112 Another example of the fact that harassers are generally aware of the consequences 
of their actions can be found in the decision in Harris v. Forklift Systems. In that case, 
Hardy, the president of the company, had subjected the plaintiff to a series of humiliating 
conduct, including calling her a “dumb ass woman” and asking her to retrieve coins from 
his front pants pocket. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19. After the conduct had gone on for some 
time, Harris complained about the conduct to Hardy, who indicated that he was surprised 
that she was offended and promised to stop. Only a few weeks later, however, he asked 
her, in front of other employees, whether she had promised a client sex to secure a deal. Id. 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the federal district court upheld the magistrate’s 
determination that until Harris complained, Hardy “had no knowledge of the fact that [the] 
plaintiff was [offended] by any of his conduct.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., No. 3:89-0557, 
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19928, at *2–3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 1994). Quite apart from the 
questionable conclusion that a man seemingly intelligent enough to be president of a 
company would not understand the offensiveness of calling a female manager a “dumb ass 
woman” and asking women to retrieve coins from his front pants pocket without first being 
told, even the district court apparently could comprehend that Hardy understood that his 
conduct was offensive after he had been told that it was.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Conceptualizing sexual harassment as a dignitary tort, such as the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, is not without its risks, including 
the fact that such a conceptualization may suggest that sexual harassment 
constitutes more of a harm to the dignity interests of women than to their 
employment opportunities. Such a result would constitute a substantial step 
backward for recognition of the harms of sexual harassment, harking back to 
the days in which courts rejected such claims under Title VII because the 
courts viewed the harms being complained about as being “personal” rather 
than related to employment. 
However, it should be possible to establish that sexual harassment is both 
a harm to the dignitary interests of those subjected to it and a harm to society’s 
interests in workplace equality. Indeed, these interests should in fact be seen as 
complementary rather than contradictory, such that the dignity of women and 
men subjected to sexual harassment is particularly implicated by the inequality 
inherent in sexually harassing behavior. That is, courts should recognize that 
the very nature of the workplace inequality that causes sexually harassing 
conduct, as well as results from such conduct, is precisely what causes that 
conduct to be particularly damaging to the dignity interests of employees and 
for that reason meet the standards of extreme and outrageous behavior that is 
intolerable in a civilized society. 
  

